Can We Distinguish Between Types of Consciousness?

I have articulated the idea that there are three potential types of consciousness. Descartes went to a personal Hell to establish that at least the individual instantiation of natural consciousness does. The other two types- artificial and synthetic- have no direct evidence yet. However, such does not imply that those types do not exist or will not exist in the future. Thus, I find myself asking, can we distinguish between types of consciousness? Let’s find out!

Distinguishing Between Consciousnesses

There are two paths we might choose from in this argument. First, that all forms of consciousness will be indistinguishable. Second, forms of consciousness will be distinguishable. I’m going to argue from the perspective of the former. That is, with what we know about consciousness, I find little rationale for a claim that the types of consciousness are distinguishable. Here’s my reasoning:

Two propositions form the foundation - (1) Things either have consciousness or don’t and (2) We are conscious. Now, we believe other things like us either are conscious or they are not too. Further, we perceive things like us to be conscious because they act similarly. At the same time, we seem to believe that things not like us (e.g., plants) are not conscious because those things are not like us. Let’s focus on the things like us part for a moment.

Let’s consider an example.

I’m writing an essay. You are writing an essay as well.

Because I am conscious, and I perceive my consciousness to be the source of my ability to write (and read, by proxy), then you must be conscious too and your consciousness must be like mine in both kind and degree. Obviously, I could ask you if you’re conscious, but I’d have no way to know if you’re lying.

Okay; that tells us quite a lot about distinguishing between types of consciousness as long as we’re paying attention. That is, consciousness is simply itself - there’s no objective difference between consciousness once those consciousnesses are instantiated. This jives with the notion that consciousness is either on or off, binary to the core.

However, our determination that something like us is conscious is implicit and subconscious. We don’t actively think that the other essay writer must also be conscious because we are; we simply operate as if all of this true. Further, we presuppose that consciousness is the origin of behavior rather than the mediation layer between sensory input and mind/cognition.

So then, what basis do we have to think that artificial or synthetic consciousness would differ in kind?

In the case of artificial consciousness, because it is by definition imitative of us, I don’t see how we’ll be able to differentiate at all. In the case of synthetic consciousness, well that’s a hard nut.

Plants don’t act like us. However, plant consciousness, if it exists and given what we know about our consciousness, ought to not be different in kind. I think this might be the case because if we can detect it, then it must be detectable. To be detectable, it must be like ours.

To be clear, I would suggest that consciousnesses being indistinguishable is potentially a bad thing. Tune in next time for my thoughts on why that is and how we might address such.